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The European Union-Caribbean Relation:
On the Apparent Deterioration of the
EU-Caribbean Relationship
Morten BROBERG*
EU diplomats consider the Caribbean countries to be allies and therefore expect these countries
to support the EU in international affairs – but they find that this support has been waning in
recent years. Caribbean diplomats and politicians do not share the European viewpoint. Rather,
they take the view that the EU has forgotten its Caribbean allies and instead channels its
attention and funding towards Sub-Saharan Africa.This article examines to what extent this
asserted ‘rift’ really signals a profound change in the EU-Caribbean relations.
1 INTRODUCTION
On 14 September 2010 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly voted in
favour of postponing a decision on a draft resolution which, if adopted, would
have given the European Union a number of procedural rights within the
UN-framework; including the right to participate in the general debate of the
General Assembly and the right to be inscribed in the list of speakers among
representatives of major groups, in order to make interventions. Not only was this
a major diplomatic defeat on the part of the European Union. What European
* Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law, Denmark
(morten.broberg@jur.ku.dk).The author would like to thank his research assistant Peter Hjaltason for
excellent assistance regarding the work on this article, and in particular for the extensive help
regarding the data provided in s. 3.1 as well as with the production of figure 3.The article is primarily
based on public, written sources, but these sources have been supplemented (and verified) through a
number of informal (off-the-record) exchanges with EU diplomats based in Brussels and in some EU
Member State capitals as well as with Caribbean politicians, diplomats and academics. A preliminary
draft of this article was presented at the SALISES 15th Annual Conference, Port-of-Spain,Trinidad &
Tobago, 23–25 Apr. 2014. A considerably revised version of the paper was presented at the SALISES
16th Annual Conference in Rodney Bay, St. Lucia, 14–16 Jan. 2015. Participants at the two
conferences have provided very valuable comments. The author would also like to express his
gratitude to H.E.Ambassador Mikael Barfod of the European Union’s delegation to Barbados and East
Caribbean as well as to Development Cooperation Officer and EU Liaison Officer for human rights
Solomon Loannou and Programme Officer – Development Cooperation Monica Paul-McLean of the
European Union’s delegation toTrinidad &Tobago who kindly took time to read and discuss with the
author preliminary drafts of what eventual has become this article. Their comments have led to
extensive changes to the preliminary drafts. It goes without saying that only the author shall be held
responsible for all views and any remaining inaccuracies that appear from this article.
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Union diplomats characterize as particularly shocking was the fact that the
counter-resolution that led to the postponement was tabled by CARICOM – a
group of fifteen Caribbean States.1 In the European Union’s Member State
missions to the UN as well as in the EU offices in Brussels news of the Caribbean
opposition was received with disbelief.Talking behind firmly closed doors to both
European Union and EU Member State diplomats, the rather undiplomatic term
‘betrayal’ regularly slips through their lips.
But why do European diplomats consider it particularly aggravating that the
motion was tabled by the Caribbean countries? Apparently, it is a widespread
opinion in Brussels that for decades the two sides have been close allies in
international affairs, as has been reflected not only in strong political and cultural
ties, but also in the fact that they have cooperated for many years within the
so-called EU-African/Caribbean/Pacific (or simply ACP) framework – and for
years the European Union has provided substantial development assistance and
attractive trade preferences to the small countries on the other side of the Atlantic.
Indeed, the European Union and its Member States are the main providers of
development cooperation assistance to these countries.
In contrast, when talking to Caribbean diplomats and politicians a prevalent
viewpoint seems to be that the European Union has forgotten its (former?)
Caribbean allies so that today the Union channels virtually all its attention as well
as its funding towards Sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard the Cotonou Agreement
– the principal partnership agreement between the European Union and the ACP
countries – is singled out as representative of this and thus a major cause of what
both sides seem to view as a ‘rift’.
This article examines whether this asserted ‘rift’ between the two sides really
signals a profound change in the EU-CARICOM relations. In other words, are
the European diplomats right that they are giving special (and preferential)
treatment to the small Caribbean States, and are the Caribbean States right in
claiming that the European Union is disregarding them?We first take an overview
look at the Cotonou Agreement (section 2).Thereupon we turn to examine the
Caribbean view that the European Union is giving Sub-Saharan Africa priority at
the cost of the Caribbean (section 3). Next, we consider EU-Caribbean political
cooperation as well as to what extent cooperation with Latin America offers an
alternative to cooperation with the European Union/the ACP cooperation
framework (section 4). Based on the preceding evaluation we finally seek to
conclude whether there really is a new and profound rift between the European
Union and the Caribbean (section 5).
1 The counter-resolution was also supported by African and Pacific States that the European Union
traditionally has viewed as allies in international affairs. However, it appears that the Caribbean States
were instrumental in the EU’s defeat.
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2 THE COTONOU AGREEMENT
On 23 June 2000 in Cotonou, the capital of Bénin, seventy-six African, Caribbean
and Pacific States2 as well as the EU and all the then EU Member States signed
the ‘Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the one part and the European Community and its
Member States of the other part’; or the Cotonou Agreement as the agreement is
normally known. The agreement was concluded for a twenty-year period from
March 2000 to February 2020, and entered into force in April 2003.At the time of
writing, it has been revised twice;3 in June 20054 and in June 2010.5
Figure 1 ACP Countries 2015
Source: Produced byThea Nisted Svendsen and Morten Broberg, University of Copenhagen.
The Cotonou Agreement is only the last in a long string of EU-ACP
agreements; the first of which was signed in 1963 by eighteen, at the time newly
independent, former colonies, on the one hand, and the six founding EU Member
States and the European Union, on the other hand, not long after the genesis of
2 This figure has been based upon a count of the signatures on the Cotonou Agreement from 2000.
Somalia does not figure amongst the signatories, but has been counted amongst the Cotonou
signatories. Moreover, Timor-Leste acceded to the Agreement in 2003. Cuba is the only ACP State
that has not signed the Cotonou Agreement.This means that in June 2015 78 of the 79 ACP States
had signed the Cotonou Agreement.
3 The Cotonou Agreement in Art. 95(3) foresees that the agreement is adapted every five years until
2020.
4 Amongst the changes brought about by the first revision was a strengthening of existing provisions on
island ACP States.
5 In principle a third revision has been foreseen for 2015.
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the last-mentioned.6 The Cotonou Agreement is based on three complementary
pillars:
– Development cooperation.
– Trade cooperation.
– A political dimension.
According to Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement, its principal objective is to
reduce and eventually eradicate poverty and to do so in a way that is consistent
with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the
ACP countries into the world economy (Article 1(2) of the Cotonou Agreement).
Four fundamental principles underlie the Cotonou Agreement, namely:
– Equality of the partners, including ACP countries’ ownership of the
development strategies (Article 2(1)(1) of the Cotonou Agreement).
– Participation meaning that partnership is open to different kinds of other
actors (while central governments are the main partners) (Article 2(1)(2) of
the Cotonou Agreement).
– Dialogue and the fulfilment of mutual obligations (Article 2(1)(3) of the
Cotonou Agreement).
– Differentiation and regionalization (Article 2(1)(4) of the Cotonou
Agreement).
A central feature of the Cotonou Agreement is the active furthering of
economic development – and to this end the European Union offers substantial
funding in the form of development aid. Most of this funding is provided via the
so-called European Development Fund (or EDF); a special funding scheme which
for historical reasons is not part of the European Union’s budget as such (but is still
administered by the European Commission). For the period 2000–2007 the 9th
EDF allocated funding to the value of EUR 13.8 billion whilst the 10th EDF that
covered the period 2008–2013 provided EUR 22.7 billion.The 11th EDF, which
covers the period 2014–2020,7 provides funding from the EU Member States
totalling EUR 30.5 billion,8 and for the first time the combined resources
6 The so-calledYaoundé I Convention, signed 20 Jul. 1963.
7 The 11th EDF only entered into force on 1 Mar. 2015, cf. Council of the European Union, Notice
concerning the entry into force of the Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, on the financing of European Union aid
under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU
Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to
which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies, OJ L 45/1 (2015). See also,
Regulation 2015/322 of the Council of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European
Development Fund, OJ L 58/1 (2015) and Regulation 2015/323 of the Council of 2 March 2015 on the
financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund, OJ L 58/17 (2015).
8 In addition, the European Investment Bank will provide loans to a value of EUR 2.6 billion.
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allocated to the Caribbean amount to 1 billion.9 This very appreciable allocation
was far from a given. On the contrary, according to the European Union’s 2011
development policy strategy ‘Agenda for Change’ the allocation of EDF funding
were to be made on the basis of the principles of ‘graduation’ and ‘differentiation’
which basically means that EU aid shall be given to those countries that are most
in need and are most fragile.10 Only Bahamas and Trinidad &Tobago came under
the graduation title, i.e., their economies were considered to have developed to
such a level that they would not be offered funding under the 11th EDF. Fairly
well-off Caribbean countries such as Barbados and St. Kitts & Nevis together with
larger countries such as Jamaica were (merely) considerably differentiated (i.e., they
would still receive aid, but other poorer ACP countries were given priority when
it came to the actual allocation of aid).The poorer Caribbean countries such as St.
Vincent & the Grenadines, St. Lucia and Grenada were only subject to limited
differentiation (10–15%). The reason to this outcome regarding the 11th EDF –
which was rather attractive from the Caribbean perspective – was the perceived
vulnerability of the Caribbean countries; their small size, their economic structure,
and that they are prone to natural disasters.11 Moreover, Haiti, which is the only
Caribbean country that falls within the category of least developed countries
(LDCs), was given a larger national share of the 11th EDF than it had been given
under the 10th EDF.12
Importantly, whereas the changes to the just explained national envelopes to
the Caribbean under the 11th EDF led to reductions, this was more than
compensated by a doubling of the regional allocation from EUR 165 million
(equal to EUR 27.50 million/year) under the 10th EDF to EUR 346 million
(equal to EUR 49.43 million/year) under the 11th EDF.13
9 EEAS, GoJ/EU celebrate start of 11th European Development Fund, <http://eeas.europa.eu/
delegations/jamaica/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20141106_1_en.htm> (6 Nov. 2014).
10 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Increasing the impact of EU
Development Policy: an Agenda for Change s. 4, COM (2011) 637 final (2011).
11 For example, this has been reflected in Regulation 2015/322, supra n. 7. For a critical review of the
differentiation in the 11th EDF, see ECDPM, Differentiation in ACP-EU Cooperation: Implications of the
EU’s Agenda for Change for the 11th EDF and beyond (October 2012), <http://ecdpm.org/wp-conte
nt/uploads/2013/10/DP-134-ACP-EU-Cooperation-Implications-EU-Agenda-Change-11-EDF-20
12.pdf>.
12 Some Caribbean ACP countries also benefit from the so-called FLEX (short-term fluctuations in
export earnings) and the V-FLEX (Vulnerability FLEX) mechanisms.These mechanisms are financed
over the EDF. See Art. 68 of the Cotonou Agreement together with its Annex II as well as,Commission
Decision of 5 November 2009 concerning the 2009 Allocation of Vulnerability FLEX resources under the tenth
European Development Fund to support the most affected ACP countries cope with the global crisis and addenda
to their Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes, C(2009)8441 (2009).
13 European Commission, The Caribbean, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/caribbean-0_en>
(last updated 8 Nov. 2015).
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In other words, it would not seem right to claim that the Caribbean ACP
countries had been forgotten or disadvantaged by the European Union.
In addition to the funding via consecutive EDFs, funding for the ACP
countries is also provided over the European Union budget as such; in particular
via the so-called Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).14
In a Caribbean context it is also important to observe that part 5 of the
Cotonou Agreement has provisions specifically aimed at ‘least developed,
landlocked and island ACP States (LDLICS)’.With particular regard to the island
ACP States, Article 89(1) of Chapter 4 – bearing the title ‘Island ACP States’ –
provides as follows:
1. Specific actions shall be pursued to support island ACP States in their efforts to halt and
reverse their increasing vulnerability caused by new and severe economic, social and
ecological challenges.These actions shall seek to advance the implementation of the small
island developing States’ priorities for sustainable development, while promoting a
harmonized approach to their economic growth and human development.
Those island ACP States that may benefit from this preferential treatment are
primarily Caribbean and Pacific countries.15
Thus, even though the Cotonou Agreement first and foremost has been
drafted with the African ACP countries in mind, it is rather obvious that in relative
terms (size and economic development) the Caribbean countries have been given
a surprisingly favourable treatment.
3 THE CARIBBEAN VERSUS AFRICA
In personal interviews with the author Caribbean politicians, diplomats and
academics have expressed the view that the Cotonou Agreement has been cut
from a cloth that first of all suits the African ACP countries. This viewpoint is
probably correct. However, before we jump to the conclusion that this shows that
the European Union is merely focusing upon Africa, it may be useful to establish
some objective facts for the two regions. In this way we may compare the
14 Regulation 233/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a Financing
Instrument for Development Cooperation for the Period 2014-2020, OJ L 77/44 (2014).With regards to the
Development Cooperation Instrument and differentiation, see S. Herbert, Reassessing aid to
middle-income countries: the implications of the European Commission’s policy of differentiation for developing
countries (ODI, Working Paper 349, 2012, <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/
publications-opinion-files/7710.pdf>).
15 Cf.AnnexVI to the Cotonou Agreement which provides an exhaustive list of those island ACP States
that may benefit from this preferential treatment.The list includes the following:Antigua and Barbuda;
Bahamas; Barbados; Cape Verde; Comoros; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Fiji; Grenada; Haiti;
Jamaica; Kiribati; Madagascar; Mauritius; Papua New Guinea; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa; São Tomé and Principe; Seychelles; Solomon Islands; Tonga;
Trinidad &Tobago;Tuvalu;Vanuatu.
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treatment of the Caribbean ACP countries against that of their African
counterparts with regards to the Cotonou Agreement.
The seventy-nine States that today form the ACP group of countries are
divided between forty-eight in Sub-Saharan Africa, sixteen in the Caribbean
(including Cuba that has not signed the Cotonou Agreement) and fifteen in the
Pacific.16 The total population of the seventy-eight ACP countries that have signed
the Cotonou Agreement is 964,759,000 (2012 estimate).17 Of these,
approximately 95% (926,201,000) live in Africa, less than 3% (27,792,000) live in
the Caribbean and about 1% (10,766,000) live in the Pacific. On average each
African ACP country has a population of approximately 19,296,000 inhabitants,
each Caribbean ACP country has, on average, a population of approximately
1,853,000 inhabitants, and for each of the Pacific ACP countries the average
population is approximately 718,000 inhabitants.18
All Pacific and most Caribbean ACP countries are island States which
together with their smallness arguably make them particularly vulnerable.19 In
contrast, only six of the African ACP countries are island States (whilst fourteen of
the African ACP countries are landlocked).
Of the seventy-five ACP signatories for which data is available, thirty-nine are
LDCs,20 thirty-one are developing countries (DCs) and five are high-income (i.e.,
non-developing) countries.The geographical allocation of these categories of the
ACP countries is rather uneven, however.Thus, thirty-three (or almost 70%) of the
African ACP countries are LDCs, fifteen (or more than 30%) are DCs and none
are high-income countries. In contrast, only one (or about 7%) of the Caribbean
countries is an LDC, nine (or about 60%) are DCs and five (or about 33%) are
high-income countries.21 For the Pacific ACP countries, the figures are five (or
about 42%) LDCs, seven (or about 58%) DCs and no high-income countries.22
As is apparent from these figures, in economic terms the Caribbean ACP
countries form a rather heterogeneous group where first of all Barbados and
16 ACP Secretariat, FAQ, <http://www.acp.int/node/7> (accessed 28 Jun. 2015).
17 United Nations, World Population Prospects:The 2012 Revision,Volume I: Comprehensive Tables, table S.1,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013), <http://esa.un.org/
unpd/wpp/Documentation/pdf/WPP2012_Volume-I_Comprehensive-Tables.pdf>.
18 Ibid.
19 D. A Mohammed, The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement: Impediment or Development
Opportunity for CARIMCOM SIDS?, in The Diplomacies of Small States – Between Vulnerability and
Resilience, 160–177, 161 (A. F Cooper &T.M Shaw eds, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
20 United Nations OHRLLS,About LDCs, <http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/> (accessed 28 Jun. 2015).
21 Cuba is not a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement and has therefore not been included here; if Cuba
were to be included, it would qualify as a developing country.
22 World Bank, Country and Lending Groups, <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications
/country-and-lending-groups> (accessed 28 Jun. 2015). Data not available for Cook Islands, Nauru
and Niue. French Polynesia is a high-income country, but formally speaking forms part of France and
therefore does not fall within the ACP group.
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Trinidad & Tobago arguably are in a league of their own. Moreover, whilst the
Spanish speaking Caribbean countries (Cuba and the Dominican Republic)
primarily look towards Latin America, the non-Spanish speaking Caribbean
countries (English, French and Dutch speaking) generally continue to have much
stronger relations with Europe.
Figure 2 Map of LDCs
Source: United Nations, Development and Policy Analysis Division (http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/
cdp/ldc/profile/ accessed 28 June 2015).
Of the EUR 3,285.65 million the European Union provided in official
development assistance (ODA) to ACP countries (not including Cuba) in 2013,
EUR 2,989.57 million (approx. 91%) went to Africa, EUR 244.43 million
(approx. 7%) to the Caribbean and EUR 51.65 million (approx. 2%) to the
Pacific.23 Calculating these figures relative to population size the ACP countries
(not including Cuba) received EUR 21.25 per capita from the European Union,
though the distribution varied greatly.Thus, on average the African ACP countries
received EUR 8.54 per capita, while the Caribbean ACP countries received EUR
37.32 per capita and the Pacific ACP countries received EUR 45.84 per capita.24
Moreover, these figures do not include aid given to countries that no longer
qualify as developing (such as Trinidad &Tobago), since such aid does not count as
ODA. In other words, even though only a small part of the European Union’s
ODA goes to the Caribbean ACP countries, these countries on average
23 European Commission, Annual Report 2014 on the European Union’s development and external assistance
policies and their implementation in 2013 table 5.11, pt. I, SWD (2014) 258 final (2014).The figures given
here include funding from the European Union’s ‘Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol’
(AMSP) and ‘Banana Accompanying Measures’ (BAM) – both of which are funded via the Union’s
budget (not via the EDF). For some of the Caribbean States the majority of the development
assistance received from the European Union is provided via these two instruments.
24 Ibid., at table 5.12.
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nevertheless receive several times higher per capita assistance than do the (poorer)
African ACP countries.
Not only when it comes to development assistance do we see important
differences between the three main ACP regions. The same is certainly also the
case when it comes to trade.Thus, if we look at the total trade of each of the three
regions, we find that for the African ACP countries trade25 per capita ranges from
92 to USD 32,606.26 For the Caribbean ACP countries trade per capita ranges
from 506 to USD 21,669 and for the Pacific ACP countries trade per capita ranges
from 985 to USD 5,563.27
When it comes to the importance of the European Union as a trading partner
with the ACP countries, we find that for the African ACP countries the European
Union constitutes the primary export market for almost half of these countries
(twenty-one out of forty-eight). South Africa is the primary export market for six
of these African ACP countries. The remainder are widely spread (six have other
African ACP countries as primary export market, two have the United Arab
Emirates, one has China, one has India, two have Switzerland, and one has the
USA as primary export market).28
The situation is very different for the Caribbean ACP countries.Thus, ten of
these countries have the USA as their primary export market. For the remaining
Caribbean ACP countries, the primary export markets are evenly spread amongst
the following destinations: Dominica, St. Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago, the United
Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.29 In other words, the European Union is not the
primary export market for any of the Caribbean ACP countries.
Looking now at the Pacific ACP countries the situation changes yet again.
Thus, for four of these ACP countries, Australia constitutes the primary export
market, whilst China, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, and New Zealand each form
the primary export market for one Pacific ACP country.30 Put differently, as was
the case for the Caribbean ACP countries, none of the Pacific ACP countries has
the European Union as their primary export market.
25 ‘Trade’ includes both exports and imports and it also covers both goods and services.
26 World Trade Organization, Trade Profiles 2014 (2014), <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/trade_profiles14_e.pdf>. Data not available for Somalia and Eritrea.
27 Ibid. Data not available for Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru,
Niue, Palau, andTuvalu.
28 Ibid. Data not available for Angola, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Lone, and Somalia.
29 Ibid. Data not available for Haiti.
30 Ibid. Data not available for Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, and
Niue.
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Figure 3 Chart of the ACP Countries’ Primary Export Markets
byValue of Export of Merchandise in 2014
Source: The figure has been based upon data from World Trade Organization, Trade Profiles 2014, (accessible at https:
//www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_profiles14_e.pdf, last accessed 28 June 2015).
Turning finally to the demographic aspects of the ACP countries, we will yet
again see that we are looking at a truly heterogeneous group displaying
considerable differences. Hence, the median age of the population in the African
ACP countries is 19.3.31 In contrast, the median age is 28.8 in the Caribbean ACP
countries32 and 21.3 in the Pacific ACP countries.33 Similarly, average life
expectancy in African ACP countries is a mere 55.5 years, while it is 71.6 years in
the Caribbean ACP countries and 68.6 years in the Pacific ACP countries.34 These
figures may be compared with those of the European Union where the
population’s median age is 41.2 years,35 and the average life expectancy is 79.9
years.36
31 Global Health Observatory Data Repository, Demographic and socioeconomic statistics: Population Data by
country (recent years), <http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.POP2040?lang=en> (accessed 30 Jun.
2015).
32 Ibid. No data available for Dominica, and St. Kitts & Nevis.
33 Ibid. No data available for Cook Islands,Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, andTuvalu.
34 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, supra n. 17, at table
A.28.
35 European Commission, Eurostat Demography Report 2010, 58 (2011), <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
/documents/3217494/5740869/KE-ET-10-001-EN.PDF/b804a9ff-5113-40f4-8f2b-bd263d9828a0?
version=1.0>.The figures do not include Croatia.
36 Eurostat, Life expectancy by age and sex, <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=
demo_mlexpec&lang=en> (last updated 19 Jun. 2015).
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The best illustration of the important differences in the age distribution of the
different populations may be provided by the population pyramids of the African
ACP and the Caribbean ACP regions – together with that of the European
Union. Whilst the European Union population pyramid shows the increasingly
ageing population and the declining birth-rate that is characteristic for the global
northern countries, the African population pyramid shows the classic developing
country form.What is worth of note is that the Caribbean population pyramid lies
somewhere in-between that of the European Union and that of the African ACP
countries.
Figure 4 Age of the Population in the African ACP Countries 2014
Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base. African ACP States, (data accessible at http://www
.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?N=%20Results%20&T=12&A=both&RT=0&Y=2014&R=
-1&C=AO,BN,BC,UV,BY,CV,CM,CT,CD,CN,CF,CG,IV,DJ,EK,ER,ET,GB,GA,GH,GV,PU,KE,LT,LI,MA,MI,
MP,MZ,WA,NG,NI,RW,TP,SG,SE,SL,SO,SF,SU,WZ,TZ,TO,UG,ZA,ZI, accessed 28 June 2015).
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Figure 5 Age of the Population in the Caribbean ACP countriesCountries 2014
Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base. Caribbean ACP States, (data accessible at http://
www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?N=%20Results%20&T=12&A=both&RT=0&Y=2014
&R=-1&C=AC,BF,BB,BH,CU,DO,DR,GJ,GY,HA,JM,SC,ST,VC,NS,TD, accessed 28 June 2015).
Figure 6 Age of the Population of the European Union 2014
Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base. EU Member States, (data accessible at http://
www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?N=%20Results%20&T=12&A=both&RT=3&Y=2014
&R=201&C, accessed 28 June 2015).
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Moreover, literacy rates in the African ACP countries37 range from 25.3% to
94.2%, in the Caribbean ACP countries38 it ranges from 48.7% to 99.8%, and in
the Pacific ACP countries39 it ranges from 58.3% to 99%.40 In comparison, the
European Union average literacy rate is 99.1%.41
When it comes to ethnic and cultural composition, the three regions also
differ considerably with regards to the origins of the populations. Thus, the
populations in the African ACP countries are primarily made up of indigenous
Africans.42 The populations in the Caribbean ACP countries are primarily made
up of peoples originating from Europe and Africa43 whilst the populations in the
Pacific ACP countries primarily are a mix between indigenous people and
European immigrants.44
The above data rather clearly confirms that on a number of important
accounts the Caribbean ACP States differ from first of all the African ACP States.
This may not be surprising. Equally, it should not come as a major surprise that
the African ACP countries account for the vast majority of the total ACP region;
in population terms the latter account for approximately 95% whereas the
Caribbean ACP countries account for less than 3%. In light of this it only seems
natural that the African region takes centre-stage in the EU-ACP cooperation.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the European Union provides more than twice as
much development cooperation assistance per capita to the Caribbean ACP
countries as compared with their African counterparts. And this difference is
particularly surprising when we also take into account not only that in economic
terms the Caribbean ACP countries in general are much wealthier than the
African ones, but also that the Caribbean ACP countries have significantly fewer
37 Data not available for Djibouti, the Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Sudan.
38 Data not available for the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia,
and St.Vincent and the Grenadines. Note that the literacy rate for Haiti is 48.7%.The second lowest
Caribbean ACP State literacy rate is 85.0% (Guyana).
39 Data not available for Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands,
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Solomon Islands,Tuvalu, andVanuatu.
40 UNESCO Institute for Statistics,Adult andYouth Literacy: National, regional and global trends, 1985-2015,
31–35 (June 2013), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/adult-youth-literacy-1990-20
15-2013-en.pdf>.
41 World Bank, World Data Bank.World Development Indicators. Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15
and above), <databank.worldbank.org/data/EU-Literacy-rate/id/1177b71a> (accessed 30 Jun. 2015).
Note that the figure does not include Croatia and, more generally, that a number of high-income
countries no longer measure literacy rates (this is for instance the case with regards to Denmark).
42 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Africa. People, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/7924/
Africa> (last updated 21 Sep. 2015).
43 Encyclopaedia Britannica, West Indies, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/640195/
West-Indies> (last updated 1 Dec. 2014).
44 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Pacific Islands, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/437647/
Pacific-Islands> (accessed 28 Jun. 2015).
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challenges than do the African ACP countries so that the latter group displays a
much clearer need for assistance.
Put differently, based on the available data it appears rather difficult to argue
that the European Union is treating the Caribbean ACP countries worse than the
African ACP countries. On the contrary, based on these data the European Union
seems to treat the Caribbean ACP countries markedly better. This does not
necessarily mean that the Caribbean criticism waged against the European Union
is unfounded altogether, but arguably it means that to the extent this criticism has
been based on an argument that the European Union treats the Caribbean ACP
countries worse than the African ones, this argument must be refuted.
4 COOPERATION BETWEENTHE EUROPEAN UNION ANDTHE
CARIBBEAN
4.1 THE CARIFORUM-EU ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
To an appreciable extent the heterogeneity amongst the ACP States has been
reflected in the way the Cotonou Agreement was drafted. Thus, the agreement
itself was negotiated by all ACP States (the so-called all-ACP phase) whilst the
ACP States negotiated specific trade aspects region-by-region – where the
Caribbean ACP States (i.e., the Cariforum States) made up one out of six ACP
regions. Indeed, this regionalization is one of the more novel aspects of the
Cotonou Agreement.45 The idea was that the all-ACP phase should allow the
parties to lay down the objectives and principles for the negotiations whilst the
regional negotiations should make it possible to cater for regional priorities and
sensitivities.46 Both representatives of the Caribbean States and of the European
Union agree that during the all-ACP phase the former had considerable, albeit
indirect, influence since the ACP Secretariat always has had several influential
members from the Caribbean – and the same has generally been true with regards
to the main negotiators on the part of the ACP countries. In other words, no one
seems to take the viewpoint that the Caribbean States were ‘run over’ during the
all-ACP phase.
The negotiations between the Cariforum and the EU led to the conclusion of
the EU-Cariforum Economic Partnership Agreement; often called the
EU-Cariforum EPA or simply the C-EPA.The C-EPA is a trade and development
partnership, signed in 2008 by, on the one hand, the fifteen Caribbean States
45 See also J. Lodge, A Trade Partnership for Sustainable Development, in The CARIFORUM-EU Economic
Partnership Agreement – A Practitioners’Analysis, 19–42, 19 (A. Beviglia Zampetti & J. Lodge eds, Kluwer
Law International 2011).
46 R.Vahl, From Cotonou to Bridgetown:The Birth of the Caribbean EPA, in Beviglia Zampetti & Lodge eds,
supra n. 45, 1–10, 6–9.
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making up Cariforum47 and, on the other hand, the European Union. Its objective
is to promote trade and investment, underpin regional integration and foster
sustainable development in the Caribbean region. However, the C-EPA goes much
further than merely covering classic trade. It also covers services, competition,
innovation and intellectual property, public procurement, and environmental and
labour standards. The C-EPA is supported by European Union funding worth
EUR 140 million for the period 2012–2015.
Through the C-EPA the Cariforum countries and the European Union aim
to foster growth, jobs and development in the Caribbean.The agreement will lead
to a general opening of the EU market beyondWTO commitments in the service
sectors, including creative and entertainment industries. It ensures
duty-free-quota-free market access into the EU for all products. With regard to
EU exports to the Caribbean region, Cariforum imports of what the Cariforum
countries view as sensitive products48 from the European Union will gradually be
liberalized over a period of twenty-five years.
According to the European Union, the C-EPA is the first genuinely
comprehensive North-South trade agreement that promotes sustainable
development, builds a regional market among developing countries and helps
eliminate poverty. In the words of the European Union, the C-EPA puts the
Caribbean on the map as an expanding market, where traders and investors can
find opportunities for growth and security for their investments. Others have taken
a rather more sceptical approach to the C-EPA; for instance, Heron and
Siles-Brügge have pointed to the European Union wanting to attain liberalization
gains to the benefit of European industry as a (European) driver for the C-EPA.49
Indeed, shortly before the agreement was to be signed, some Caribbean academics
called for a renegotiation thereof.50
On the face of it, the fact that the European Union plays only a limited role
when it comes to Caribbean external trade should mean that any negative sides to
the C-EPA are likely to be of only more limited importance. It has, however, been
47 Cariforum includes fourteen of the fifteen members of CARICOM plus the Dominican Republic.
For a detailed account of both the background to the C-EPA and the actual negotiations, see R. L
Bernal, Globalization, Trade, and Economic Development: The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership
Agreement (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and A. Montoute, From Engagement to Influence: Civil Society
Participation in the EPA Trade Negotiations and Regional Integration Processes, in Re-mapping the Americas –
Trends in Region-making, 241–253 (W.A. Knight, J. Castro-Rea & H.Ghany eds,Ashgate 2014).
48 This particularly concerns agricultural and fisheries products such as sugar, rice, poultry, live animals,
fresh fruits and vegetables, as well as various processed agricultural products such as dairy and cheese,
wines and spirits, and non-alcoholic beverages.
49 T. Heron & G. Siles-Brügge, Competitive Liberalization and the ‘Global Europe’ Services and Investment
Agenda: Locating the Commercial Drivers of the EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreements, 50 J. Com.Mkt.
Stud. 250 (2012).
50 H. Brewster, N. Girvan & V. Lewis, Renegotiate the EPA (revised 23 Mar. 2008), <http://www.
normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/renegotiate-the-epa-rev1.pdf>.
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argued that the C-EPA may be used as a paradigm for trade agreements with other
more important trading partners of the Caribbean (in particular the US). In such
case – the Caribbean argument goes – the consequences of the C-EPA will
become rather more adverse than what was initially expected amongst the
Caribbean ACP countries.51 And this, together with the fact that for a long period
the European Union was rather reluctant in ‘pushing’ the African ACP countries
to enter into similar EPAs, so that still in September 2015 the C-EPA remains the
only EPA that has entered into force, form the basis for soft-spoken Caribbean
criticism of the C-EPA; and thereby in reality also of the European Union.
4.2 THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EU ACP COOPERATION
In economic terms the Caribbean countries play only a very limited role when
viewed from Brussels.This does not mean, however, that these countries are totally
unimportant in the opinion of the European Union’s policymakers.Thus, in order
to convey a more complete picture of the EU-Caribbean relationship we must
complement the above primarily economic aspects with an account of the
political dimension of the cooperation between the two sides.
There can be no doubt that the CARICOM countries can play an important
role on the international stage as vividly illustrated when they obstructed the
European Union’s efforts to be granted representative status at the UN General
Assembly in 2010. Irrespective of their (small) size, the CARICOM countries sent
a clear message that it would be wrong to overlook them in international
negotiations.52 The CARICOM countries opposition against granting the EU
representative status at the UN showed the European Union the importance of
investing the necessary time and resources to undertake diplomatic exchanges
with, amongst others, the Caribbean countries in a timely manner. Moreover, it is
important to observe that the CARICOM countries generally act rationally.
Indeed, perhaps it should not have come as such a big surprise to the European
Union that the CARICOM countries objected to the granting of representative
status to the former. Thus, rather than granting only the European Union
representative status, the CARICOM countries had a clear (and legitimate)
51 See in this respect C. Lindsay, The EU-CARIFORUM EPA: Regulatory and Policy Changes and Lessons
for Other ACP Countries, 1 (5) Caribbean J. Intl. Rel. & Dipl. 10 (2013).
52 See further V. Miller, The European Union at the United Nations (last updated 20 May 2011),
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05975>; M. Emerson & J.
Wouters, The EU’s diplomatic debacle at the UN: and now what?(updated 12 Apr. 2014), <http://
www.europeanvoice.com/article/the-eus-diplomatic-debacle-at-the-un-and-now-what/>; and M.
Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European
Diplomacy (25 Jan. 2011), <http://www.ceps.eu/book/upgrading-eus-role-global-actor-institutions-
law-and-restructuring-european-diplomacy>.
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interest in allowing a broader range of organizations (including CARICOM) to
acquire such status. In addition, the CARICOM countries traditionally have
followed the non-aligned movement which after the end of the Cold War often
recommends abstaining with regards to votes in cases where, otherwise, these
countries will appear as ‘satellite States’.53
There are, indeed, clear signs that Brussels may have learnt the lesson. For
example, cocaine produced in South America is frequently sent to Europe via
Caribbean countries; this is often referred to as the ‘Northern route’.54 And it is
not only cocaine that lands on the shores of the Caribbean countries that function
as stations en route to Europe. The cocaine business has also brought increased
crime to the islands. With Europe as the final destination for the drugs the
Caribbean countries seem to expect the European Union to take an active part in
combating the smuggling industry. Whereas, earlier, Caribbean politicians and
academics would argue that this has not happened to any appreciably extent and
that the European Union almost exclusively focussed its attention on West Africa,
the situation has changed. Thus, the European Union has allocated considerable
resources toward improving public security in (amongst other places) the
Caribbean.55 Nevertheless, when talking to Caribbean politicians and diplomats it
transpires that the extent of European Union support appears not to be fully
apprehended by the Caribbean countries. There may therefore still be room for
improving communication towards these countries.
Several other factors lend support to the view that the situation is not as
black-and-white as has been indicated by several diplomats and politicians. Thus,
on a number of weighty issues the European Union and the Caribbean countries
cooperate on the international stage with regards to several important matters. For
instance, this was the case in the negotiations that ultimately led to the adoption of
the UN ArmsTradeTreaty; also known as the Small ArmsTreaty.56 Similarly, in the
field of international trade regulation have the Caribbean countries proved to be
important partners – and supporters – of the European Union.And the two sides
also cooperate when it comes to areas such as climate change and renewable
energy, environmental protection, and protection of children. In other words, in
53 See for instance the United Nations General Assembly vote on Resolution 68/262 (‘Territorial
integrity of Ukraine’) in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea. Cuba voted against whereas
other Caribbean countries were divided between those who abstained and those who voted in favour.
54 EMCDDA and Europol, Cocaine – A European Union perspective in the global context (2010), http://
www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_101612_EN_TDAN09002ENC.pdf.
55 European Commission and High Representative of the Union, Joint Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council – Elements for an EU strategy on public security in Central America and the
Caribbean, JOIN (2014) 21 final (2014).
56 C. Joseph, Reflections from the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations: CARICOM Punching and Succeeding Above
ItsWeight, 1 Caribbean J. Intl. Rel. & Dipl. 93 (2013); and K. Prizeman, From Preparations to Negotiations
for an ArmsTradeTreaty (Mar. 2012), <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/08953.pdf>.
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international affairs the Caribbean countries both act as partners where there are
common interests with the European Union and as opponents when there are
conflicting interests. They are very conscious about their independence and,
despite their small size, the opposition these countries may generate has shown
that it will be unwise for the European Union not to take them seriously.
In an apparent recognition of the importance of cultivating the connections
with the Caribbean countries, the European Union has decided to offer nationals
of a number of these countries visa-free access to the European Union for up to
ninety days.57 This visa-waiver is not only a practical gesture but also a way
whereby the European Union signals that it considers the Caribbean countries to
be ‘safe’.
Whilst in economic terms the Caribbean countries are of only minor
importance when viewed from the European Union’s offices in Brussels, the
situation is different when it comes to non-economic issues.Therefore, the European
Union would probably be well advised if it took this into due account with
regards to its relations with these countries.
4.3 LATIN AMERICA AS ALLIES FOR CARICOM COUNTRIES?
The Caribbean ACP countries find themselves in a peculiar position. From a
historical perspective, they have important similarities to the majority of the
African and Pacific ACP countries since most of these have had colonial ties until
after World War II to first of all France and the United Kingdom.58 However, as
time passes by the importance of these historical ties necessarily fades whereas
other factors gain more weight, such as country size, economic performance and
trade patterns. In this context it has been rightly pointed out that ‘[t]he new trade
environment presents formidable challenges and dilemmas for the small vulnerable
states of the Caribbean Community’.59
Whilst the Caribbean ACP countries may seem to have only little in common
with the African ACP countries,60 on the face of it, the former may seem to have
a good deal in common with the Latin American countries. Indeed, in the
57 Regulation 509/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 amending Council
Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 listing the Third Countries whose Nationals must be in Possession of Visas
when crossing the External Borders and those whose Nationals are exempt from that Requirement, OJ L 149/67
(2014).
58 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Western Colonialism (last updated 28 Mar. 2014), <http://global.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/126237/colonialism-Western>.
59 M. Freckleton & N. Karagiannis, Development Policy Options for CARICOM in an Era of Free Trade, in
The Caribbean Economies in an Era of FreeTrade 109–129, 125 (N. Karagiannis & M.Witter eds,Ashgate,
2004).
60 See also F. Jawara & A. Kwa, Behind the scenes at the WTO: the real world of international trade
negotiations/lessons of Cancun – updated edition, 157 (Zed Books Ltd, 2004).
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European Union’s Latin America policy, the Caribbean countries are given an
important role. However, if we consider the actual cooperation between the Latin
American countries on the one hand, and the non-Spanish speaking Caribbean
countries on the other hand, it is surprising that between the two sides we are
only able to find rather limited connectors in areas such as trade, infrastructure
interconnectivity, large-scale investments, political dialogue, and cultural relations.
Moreover, just as the Caribbean countries are clearly dwarfed by most of the
African ACP countries, the same is certainly true if we compare the Caribbean
ACP countries to Latin American countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and
Mexico.Thus, the dilemma with regard to size is equally apparent in this context.
In other words, when viewed from the outside, the main challenge facing the
Caribbean ACP countries is that they are easily grouped with other countries that
are faced with very different challenges. In principle, we may also expect that, due
to size, these other countries are capable of speaking with a much louder voice
than are the Caribbean countries, but, as we have seen above, the Caribbean ACP
countries have shown themselves very apt at positioning themselves in
organizations such as the ACP Secretariat as well as in international negotiations.
5 IS THE EUROPEAN UNION-CARIBBEAN RELATIONSHIP REALLY
DETERIORATING?
Above we have seen that whereas the European Union’s interests vis-à-vis the
ACP countries are fairly coherent, the ACP countries’ interests vis-à-vis the
European Union are much more diversified and in some respects perhaps even
mutually conflicting. As we have also seen above, the European Union and the
ACP countries have attempted to accommodate this dilemma through
regionalization of the Cotonou Agreement. Firstly, so that in practice there are
certain sections of the Agreement that primarily cater for African ACP countries
whereas other sections primarily cater for Caribbean and Pacific ACP countries.
And, secondly, by making the EU-ACP trade agreements (the ‘Economic
Partnership Agreements’) regional rather than ACP-wide. From the ACP
countries’ point of view these steps certainly make good sense.61 Still, is there not
an appreciable risk that Caribbean (and Pacific) ACP countries are not fully heard
at the ACP-wide stage of the negotiations taking into account that the African
ACP countries are much larger, much more numerous and play a more important
role in the European Union’s external policy?
We have seen that in several important respects the Caribbean ACP countries
differ from the African ACP countries. It is also clear – and natural – that the
61 See in support of this regional approach, Lodge, supra n. 45, 41.
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African ACP countries play a more prominent role in the European Union’s
relations with the ACP group of countries. At the same time both civil servants
from the European Union and from the Caribbean countries take the view that
the latter have a surprisingly strong influence in the ACP Secretariat and thereby
(indirectly) upon the ACP negotiation position. Moreover, during the negotiations
on the Cotonou Agreement the challenges posed by the regional differences were
also addressed by splitting the negotiations into two phases: First an all-ACP phase
followed by a region-by-region phase.
It seems rather clear that the bottom-line is that the Caribbean ACP countries
receive significantly better treatment by the European Union than do their African
counterparts. Indeed, whilst the African ACP countries clearly are much more in
need than the Caribbean ACP countries, the latter receive close to five times as
much development assistance relative to population size from the European Union
(Commission administered assistance) than do the former. It appears that the
Caribbean countries fail to fully acknowledge this favourable treatment. If the
European Union were better at displaying the benefits that it offers the Caribbean
ACP countries this could probably help ease the Caribbean perception of being
neglected.
The above leads to the question why the European Union continues to offer
the Caribbean (and the Pacific) such a relatively high proportion of aid and
technical assistance as well as such particular attention with regards to trade despite
the Caribbean countries’ small population and relatively developed economies? As
we have seen above, the answer cannot be found in the objective economic
fundamentals. Indeed, the European Union’s increased emphasis upon graduation
and differentiation would seem to work against the Caribbean ACP countries and
to the benefit of Sub-Saharan African LDCs. Nor do geopolitical considerations
seem to provide the answer.
Perhaps the most likely answer is that the European Union views its
cooperation with the Caribbean ACP countries as a ‘model’ of interregional trade
and development cooperation which should be spread to other ACP regions. In
this respect the fact that all the other ACP regions refused to accede to models
similar to the Carifroum model arguably in itself made it even more imperative for
the European Union that the Cariforum model should be considered a success; if
the Cariforum model were to be viewed as a failure by the other ACP regions the
European Union’s possibilities of establishing similar models with the African and
the Pacific groups of ACP countries would become even more difficult to attain.
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